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In the early nineties there was much hope that neural networks would provide the next 
breakthrough in understanding biological intelligence, but that was belied by subsequent 
research. The recent success of several teams in meeting the $2 million DARPA Grand 
Challenge 2005 of designing an autonomous car that finishes a designated route of 175 
mile over desert terrain featuring natural and man-made obstacles within 10 hours [1] 
raises the question if AI might be poised for another period of high support and increased 
expectations.  
 
The quest for AI is also the subtext to debates outside of the field of computer science. 
Physics, for example, is the discovery of formal structures in nature, and each of these 
formal systems could be interpreted as a natural machine. The claim of some physicists 
that the universe itself is a giant machine is taken to complement the belief that true 
machine intelligence and self-awareness should arise after machine complexity has 
crossed a critical threshold.  
 
But this leads to certain difficulties. Since machines only follow instructions, it is not 
credible that they should suddenly, on account of a greater number of connections 
between computing units, become endowed with self-awareness. On the other hand, if 
one accepts that machines will never become self-aware, one may ask why is the brain-
machine conscious, whereas the silicon-computer is not? Perhaps the answer to this 
puzzle is that the brain is a self-organizing system which responds to the nature and 
quality of its interaction with the environment, whereas computers don’t do that. But 
other ecological systems, which are biological communities that have complex 
interrelationship amongst its components, are self-organizing, without being self-aware. 
This suggests that while self-organization is a necessary pre-requisite for consciousness, 
it is not sufficient.  
 
Yet another possibility is that current science, even when it considers self-organization 
and special structures of the brain, does not capture the essence of consciousness. The 
scientific framework may be incomplete in a variety of ways. We may not yet have 
discovered all the laws of nature, and our current theories may need major revision that 
has implications for our understanding of consciousness.  
 
In truth, objective knowledge consists of many paradoxes. Accumulation of knowledge 
often amounts to making ad hoc choices in the underlying formal framework to conform 
to experience. The most fundamental, and a very ancient, antinomy is that between 
determinism and free will. Formal knowledge can at best be compared to a patchwork. 
The riddle is: How is a part of the physical world generating the individual’s mental 
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picture, in turn, creates the scientific theory that is able to describe nature so well? Why is 
mathematics so unreasonably effective?  
 
Cognitive scientists and biologists have considered evolutionary aspects related to 
cognitive capacity, where consciousness is viewed as emerging out of language. 
Linguistic research on chimpanzees and bonobos has revealed that although they can be 
taught basic vocabulary of several hundred words, this linguistic ability does not extend 
to syntax. By contrast, small children acquire much larger vocabularies -- and use the 
words far more creatively -- with no overt training, suggesting that language is an innate 
capacity.  
 
According to the nativist view, language ability is rooted in the biology of the brain, and 
our ability to use grammar and syntax is an instinct, dependent on specific modules of the 
brain. Therefore, we learn language as a consequence of a unique biological adaptation, 
and not because it is an emergent response to the problem of communication confronted 
by ourselves and our ancestors.  
 
It has been suggested that human language capacities arose out of biological natural 
selection because they fulfill two clear criteria: an extremely complex and rich design and 
the absence of alternative processes capable of explaining such complexity. Other 
theories look at music and language arising out of sexual selection. But, howsoever 
imaginative and suggestive these models might be, they do not address the question of 
how the capacity to visualize models of world that are essential to language and 
consciousness first arise.  
 
Finally, there is a philosophical critique of the search of a theory of consciousness. 
According to this critique, all that normal science can hope to achieve is a description of 
objects. But consciousness is a property of the subject, the experiencing “I”, which, 
owing to its nature, for ever lies outside the pale of normal science. The experimenter 
cannot turn his gaze upon himself, and ordinary reality must have a dual aspect.  This 
duality means that the world of objective causality is incomplete, creating a fundamental 
paradox: If objects are described by normal science, why is that science not rich enough 
to describe the body associated with the experiencing subject?  
 
In recent work [2], I have considered evidence that negates the view that the brain is an 
ordinary machine. I argue that even with self-organization and hitherto-unknown 
quantum characteristics one cannot explain the capacities associated with the brain. A 
summary of these arguments follows. 
 
Brain and Mind 
 
The question of consciousness is connected to the relationship between brain and mind. 
Reductionism takes it that they are identical, and mind is only the sum total of the activity 
in the brain, viewed at a suitable higher level of representation. Opposed to this is the 
viewpoint that although mind requires a physical structure, it ends up transcending that 
structure.  
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The mind processes signals coming into the brain to obtain its understandings in the 
domains of seeing, hearing, touching, and tasting using its store of memories. But a 
cognitive act is an active process where the selectivity of the sensors and the 
accompanying processing in the brain is organized based on the expectation of the 
cognitive task and on effort, will and intention. Intelligence is a result of the workings of 
numerous active cognitive agents.  
 
The reductionist approach to artificial intelligence emerged out of an attempt to 
mechanize logic in the 1930s. In turn, AI and computer science influenced research in 
psychology and neuroscience and the view developed that a cognitive act is a logical 
computation. This appeared reasonable as long as classical computing was the only 
model of effective computation. But with the advent of quantum computing theory, we 
know that the mechanistic model of computing does not capture all the power of natural 
computation. 
 
Schrödinger spoke of the arithmetic paradox related to the mind as being “the many 
conscious egos from whose mental experiences the one world is concocted.” He added 
[3] that there are only two ways out of the number paradox. “One way out is the 
multiplication of the world in Leibniz’s fearful doctrine of monads: every monad to be a 
world by itself, no communication between them; the monad ‘has no windows’, it is 
‘incommunicado’. That none the less they all agree with each other is called ‘pre-
established harmony’. I think there are few to whom this suggestion appeals, nay who 
would consider it a mitigation at all of the numerical antinomy. There is obviously only 
one alternative, namely the unification of minds or consciousnesses.”
 
Languages of Description 
 
Progress in science is reflected in a corresponding development of language. The vistas 
opened up by the microscope, the telescope, tomography and other sensing devices have 
resulted in the naming of new entities and processes.  
 
The language for the description of the mind in scientific discourse has not kept pace 
with the developments in the physical sciences. The mainstream discussion has moved 
from the earlier dualistic models of common belief to one based on the emergence of 
mind from the complexity of the parallel computer-like brain processes. The two old 
paradigms of determinism and autonomy, expressed sometimes in terms of separation 
and interconnectedness, show up in various guises. Which of the two of these is in favor 
depends on the field of research and the prevailing fashions. Although quantum theory 
has provided the foundation for physical sciences for seventy years, it is only recently 
that holistic, quantum-like operations in the brain have been considered. This fresh look 
has been prompted by the setbacks suffered by the various artificial intelligence projects 
and also by new analysis and experimental findings. 
 
The languages used to describe the workings of the brain have been modeled after the 
dominant scientific paradigm of the age. The rise of mechanistic science saw the 
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conceptualization of the mind as a machine. Although the neural network approach has 
had considerable success in modeling many counterintuitive illusions, there exist other 
processes in human and nonhuman cognition that appear to fall outside the scope of such 
models. Briefly, the classical neural network model does not provide a resolution to the 
question of binding of patterns: How do the neuron firings in the brain come to have 
specific meanings or lead to specific images?
 
Considering that the physical world is described at its most basic level by quantum 
mechanics, how can classical computational basis underlie the description of the structure  
(mind) that in turn is able to comprehend the universe? How can machines, based on 
classical logic, mimic biological computing? One may argue that ultimately the 
foundation on which the circuitry of classical computers is based is at its deepest 
level described by quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, actual computations are governed 
by a binary logic which is very different from the tangled computations of quantum 
mechanics. And since the applicability of quantum mechanics is not constrained, in 
principle, by size or scale, classical computers do appear to be limited. 
 
Why cannot a classical computer reorganize itself in response to inputs? If it did, it will 
soon reach an organizational state associated with some energy minimum and will then 
stop responding to the environment. Once this state has been reached the computer will 
now merely transform data according to its program. In other words, a classical computer 
does not have the capability to be selective about its inputs. This is precisely what 
biological systems can do with ease. 
 
Most proposals on considering brain function to have a quantum basis have done so by 
default. In short the argument is: There appears to be no resolution to the problem of 
the binding of patterns and there are non-local aspects to cognition; quantum behavior 
has non-local characteristics; so brain behavior might have a quantum basis.  
 
Newer analysis has led to the understanding that one needs to consider reorganization as 
a primary process in the brain--- this allows the brain to define the context. The signal 
flows now represent the processing or recognition done within the reorganized hardware. 
Such a change in perspective can have significant implications. Dual signaling schemes 
eventually need an explanation in terms of a binding field; they do not solve the basic 
binding problem in themselves but they do make it easier to understand the process of 
adaptation. 
 
Biological Intelligence 
 
For all computational models, the question of the emergence of intelligence is a basic 
one. Solving a specified problem, that often requires searching or generalization, is taken 
to be a sign of AI, which is assumed to have an all or none quality. But biological 
intelligence has gradation. Animal performance depends crucially on its normal behavior. 
It may be argued that all animals are sufficiently intelligent because they survive in their 
ecological environment. Nevertheless, even in cognitive tasks of the kind normally 
associated with human intelligence, animals may perform well. Thus rats might find their 
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way through a maze, or dolphins may solve logical problems to or problems involving 
some kind of generalization. These performances could, in principle, be used to define a 
gradation. 
 
It has generally been assumed that the tasks that set the human apart from the machine 
are those that relate to abstract conceptualization best represented by language 
understanding. But nobody will deny that deaf-mutes, who don’t have a language, do 
think. Language is best understood as a subset of a large repertoire of behavior. Research 
has now established that animals think and are capable of learning and problem solving. 
  
Since nonhumans do not use abstract language, their thinking is based on discrimination 
at a variety of levels. If such conceptualization is seen as a result of evolution, it is not 
necessary that this would have developed in exactly the same manner for all species. 
Other animals learn concepts nonverbally, so it is hard for humans, as verbal animals, to 
determine their concepts. It is for this reason that the pigeon has become a favorite with 
intelligence tests; like humans, it has a highly developed visual system, and we are 
therefore likely to employ similar cognitive categories. It is to be noted that pigeons and 
other animals are made to respond in extremely unnatural conditions in Skinner boxes of 
various kinds. The abilities elicited in research must be taken to be merely suggestive of 
the intelligence of the animal, and not the limits of it. 
 
In a classic experiment, Herrnstein  [4] presented 80 photographic slides of natural scenes 
to pigeons who were accustomed to pecking at a switch for brief access to feed. The 
scenes were comparable but half contained trees and the rest did not. The tree 
photographs had full views of single and multiple trees as well as obscure and distant 
views of a variety of types. The slides were shown in no particular order and the pigeons 
were rewarded with food if they pecked at the switch in response to a tree slide; 
otherwise nothing was done. Even before all the slides had been shown the pigeons were 
able to discriminate between the tree and the non-tree slides. To confirm that this ability, 
impossible for any machine to match, was not somehow learnt through the long process 
of evolution and hardwired into the brain of the pigeons, another experiment was 
designed to check the discriminating ability of pigeons with respect to fish and non-fish 
scenes and once again the birds had no problem doing so. Over the years it has been 
shown that pigeons can also distinguish: (1) oak leaves from leaves of other trees, (ii) 
scenes with or without bodies of water, (iii) pictures showing a particular person from 
others with no people or different individuals. 
 
Other examples of animal intelligence include mynah birds who can recognize trees or 
people in pictures, and signal their identification by vocal utterances---words---instead of 
pecking at buttons, and a parrot who can answer, vocally, questions about shapes and 
colours of objects, even those not seen before. The intelligence of higher animals, such as 
apes, elephants, and dolphins is even more remarkable. 
 
Another recent summary of this research is that of Wasserman [5]: “[Experiments] 
support the conclusion that conceptualization is not unique to human beings. Neither 
having a human brain nor being able to use language is therefore a precondition for 
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cognition... Complete understanding of neural activity and function must encompass the 
marvelous abilities of brains other than our own. If it is the business of brains to think and 
to learn, it should be the business of behavioral neuroscience to provide a full account of 
that thinking and learning in all animals---human and nonhuman alike.” 
 
An extremely important insight from experiments of animal intelligence is that one can 
attempt to define different gradations of cognitive function. It is obvious that animals are 
not as intelligent as humans; likewise, certain animals appear to be more intelligent than 
others. For example, pigeons did poorly at picking a pattern against two other identical 
ones, as in picking an A against two B's. This is a very simple task for humans. 
 
Wasserman devised an experiment to show that pigeons could be induced to amalgamate 
two basic categories into one broader category not defined by any obvious perceptual 
features. The birds were trained to sort slides into two arbitrary categories, 
such as category of cars and people and the category of chairs and flowers. In the second 
part of this experiment, the pigeons were trained to reassign one of the stimulus classes in 
each category to a new response key. Next, they were tested to see whether they would 
generalize the reassignment to the stimulus class withheld during reassignment training. 
It was found that the average score was 87 percent in the case of stimuli that had been 
reassigned and 72 percent in the case of stimuli that had not been reassigned. This 
performance, exceeding the level of chance, indicated that perceptually disparate stimuli 
had amalgamated into a new category. A similar experiment was performed on preschool 
children. The children's score was 99 percent for stimuli that had been reassigned and 80 
percent for stimuli that had not been reassigned. In other words, the children's 
performance was roughly comparable to that of pigeons. Clearly, the performance of 
adult humans at this task will be superior to that of children or pigeons. 
 
Another interesting experiment related to the abstract concept of sameness. Pigeons were 
trained to distinguish between arrays composed of a single, repeating icon and arrays 
composed of 16 different icons chosen out of a library of 32 icons. During training each 
bird encountered only 16 of the 32 icons; during testing it was presented with arrays 
made up of the remaining 16 icons. The average score for training stimuli was 83 percent 
and the average score for testing stimuli was 71 percent. These figures show that an 
abstract concept not related to the actual associations learnt during training had been 
internalized by the pigeon.  
 
Animal intelligence experiments suggest that one can speak of different styles of solving 
AI problems. Are the cognitive capabilities of pigeons limited because their style has 
fundamental limitations? It is possible that the relatively low scores on the sameness test 
for pigeons can be explained on the basis of wide variability in performance for 
individual pigeons and the unnatural conditions in which the experiments are performed. 
But is the cognitive style of all animals similar and the differences in their cognitive 
capabilities arise from the differences in the sizes of their mental hardware? Since current 
machines do not, and cannot, use inner representations, it is right to conclude that their 
performance can never match that of animals. Most importantly, the generalization 
achieved by pigeons and other nonhumans remains beyond the capability of machines. 
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A useful perspective on animal behavior is its recursive nature, or part-whole hierarchy. 
Considering this from the bottom up, animal societies have been viewed as 
superorganisms. For example, the ants in an ant colony may be compared to cells, 
their castes to tissues and organs, the queen and her drones to the generative system, and 
the exchange of liquid food amongst the colony members to the circulation of blood and 
lymph. Furthermore, corresponding to morphogenesis in organisms the ant colony has 
sociogenesis, which consists of the processes by which the individuals undergo changes 
in caste and behavior. Such recursion has been viewed all the way up to the earth itself 
seen as a living entity. Parenthetically, it may be asked whether the earth itself, as a living 
but unconscious organism, may not be viewed like the unconscious brain. Paralleling this 
recursion is the individual who can be viewed as a collection of several agents where 
these agents have sub-agents which are the sensory mechanisms and so on. But these 
agents are bound together and this binding defines consciousness. 
 
 
Holistic Processing and Quantum Models 
 
The quantum mechanical approach to the study of consciousness has an old history and 
the creators of quantum theory were amongst the first to suggest it. More recently, 
scholars have proposed specific quantum theoretic models of brain function, but there is 
no single model that has emerged as the favored one at this point. In my own work I have 
considered the connections between quantum theory and information arguing that brain's 
processing is organized in a hierarchy of languages: associative at the bottom, self-
organizational in the middle, and quantum at the top. Neural learning is associative and it 
proceeds to create necessary structures to “measure” the stimulus-space; at the higher 
level of multiple agents the response is by reorganizing the grosser levels of the neural 
structure. Each cognitive agent is an abstract quantum system. The linkages amongst the 
agents are regulated by an appropriate quantum field. This allows the individual at the 
higher levels of abstraction to initiate cognition or action, leading to active behavior. 
 
One striking success of the quantum models is that they provide a resolution to the 
determinism- free will problem. According to quantum theory, a system evolves causally 
until it is observed. The act of observation causes a break in the causal chain. This leads 
to the notion of a participatory universe [6]. Consciousness provides a break in the strict 
regime of causality. It would be reasonable to assume that this freedom is associated with 
all life. But its impact on the ongoing processes will depend on the entropy associated 
with the break in the causal chain.  
 
Quantum theory defines knowledge in a relative sense. In the quantum world, it is 
meaningless to talk of an objective reality. Knowledge is a collection of the observations 
on the reductions of the wavefunction, brought about by measurements using different 
kinds of instrumentations. 
 
The indeterminacy of quantum theory does not reside in the microworld alone. For 
example, Schrödinger's cat paradox shows how a microscopic uncertainty transforms into 
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a microscopic uncertainty. Brain processes are not described completely by the neuron 
firings; one must, additionally, consider their higher order bindings, such as thoughts and 
abstract concepts, because they, in turn, have an influence on the neuron firings. A 
wavefunction describing the brain would then include variables for the higher order 
processes, such as abstract concepts as well. But such a definition will leave certain 
indeterminacy in our description. 
 
Reorganizing Signals 
 
Living systems are characterized by continual adaptive organization at various levels. 
The reorganization is a response to the complex of signal flows within the larger system. 
For example, the societies of ants or bees may be viewed as single superorganisms. 
Hormones and other chemical exchanges among the members of the colony determine 
the ontogenies of the individuals within the colony. More pronounced than this global 
exchange is the activity amongst the individuals in cliques or groups. 
 
Paralleling trophallaxis is the exchange of neurotransmitters or electrical impulses within 
a neural network at one level, and the integration of sensory data, language, and ideas at 
other levels. An illustration of this is the adaptation of somatosensory cortex to 
differential inputs. The cortex enlarges its representation of particular fingers when 
they are stimulated, and it reduces its representation when the inputs are diminished, such 
as by limb deafferentation. 
 
Adaptive organization may be a general feature of neural networks and of the neocortex 
in particular. Biological memory and learning within the cortex may be organized 
adaptively. While there are many ways of achieving this, nesting among neural networks 
within the cortex is a key principle in self-organization and adaptation. Nested distributed 
networks provide a means of orchestrating bottom-up and top-down regulation of 
complex neural processes operating within and between many levels of structure. 
 
There may be at least two modes of signaling that are important within a nested 
arrangement of distributed networks. A fast system manifests itself as spatiotemporal 
patterns of activation among modules of neurons. These patterns flicker and encode 
correlations that are the signals of the networks within the cortex. They are analogous to 
the hormones and chemical exchanges of the ant or bee colonies in the example 
mentioned earlier. In the brain, the slow mode is mediated by such processes as protein 
phosphorylation and synaptic plasticity. They are the counterparts of individual 
ontogenies in the ant or bee colonies. The slow mode is intimately linked to learning and 
development (i.e., ontogeny), and experience with and adaptation to the environment 
affect both learning and memory. 
 
By considering the question of adaptive organization in the cortex, our approach is in 
accordance with the ideas of Gibson [7] who has long argued that biological processing 
must be seen as an active process. We make the case that nesting among cortical 
structures provides a framework in which active reorganization can be efficiently and 
easily carried out. The processes are manifest by at least two different kinds of signaling, 
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with the consequence that the cortex is viewed as a dynamic system at many levels, 
including the level of brain regions. Consequently, functional anatomy, including the 
realization of the homunculus in the motor and sensory regions, is also dynamic. The  
homunculus is an evolving, and not a static representation, in this view. 
 
It is not known how appropriate associative modules come into play in response to a 
stimulus. This is an important open question in neural computing. The paradigm of 
“active” processing in the context of memory is usually treated in one of two ways. First, 
the processing may be pre-set. This is generally termed “supervised learning”, and it is a  
powerful but limited form of active processing. A second type of processing does not 
involve an explicit teacher, and this mechanism is termed “unsupervised learning”. It is 
sensitive to a number of constraints, including the structure and modulation of the 
network under consideration. 
 
There are different ways that biological memory may be self-organizing, and in this 
section, we suggest that the nesting of distributed neural networks within the neocortex is 
a natural candidate for encoding and transducing memory. Nesting has interesting 
combinatorial and computational features, and the seemingly simplistic organization of 
nested neural networks may have profound computational properties. However, we do 
not claim that nesting is the only important feature for adaptive organization in neural 
systems. 
 
The neocortex is a great expanse of neural tissue that makes up the bulk of the human 
brain. As in all other species, the human neocortex is made up of neural building blocks. 
At a rudimentary level, these blocks consist of columns oriented perpendicular to the 
surface of the cortex. These columns may be seen as organized in the most basic form as 
minicolumns of about 30 µm in diameter. The minicolumns are, in turn, organized into 
larger columns of approximately 500 - 1000 µm in diameter. It has been estimated that 
the human neocortex contains about 600 million minicolumns and about 600,000 larger 
columns. Columns are defined by ontogenetic and functional criteria, and there is 
evidence that columns in different brain regions coalesce into functional modules. 
Different regions of the brain have different architectonic properties, and subtle 
differences in anatomy are associated with differences in function. 
 
Beginning with cortical minicolumns, progressive levels of cortical structure consist of 
columns, modules, regions and systems. It is assumed that these structures evolve and 
adapt through the lifespan. It is also assumed that the boundaries between the clusters are 
plastic: they change slowly due to synaptic modifications or, more rapidly, due to 
synchronous activity among adjacent clusters. 
 
Results from the study of neural circuits controlling rhythmic behavior, such as feeding, 
locomotion, and respiration, show that the same network, through a process of “rewiring” 
can express different functional capabilities. 
 
 
Superorganisms also have nested structures in terms of individuals who interact more 
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with certain members than others. In the case of ants, the castes provide further 
“modular” structure. For the case of honeybees [8]: “[It is important to recognize] 
subsystems of communication, or cliques, in which the elements interact more frequently 
with each other than with other members of the communication system. In context, the 
dozen or so honeybee workers comprising the queen retinue certainly communicate more 
within their group (including the queen) than they do with the one or two hundred house 
bees receiving nectar loads from foragers returning from the field. The queen retinue 
forms one communication clique while the forager-receiver bees form another clique.”  
 
Another fundamental communication within the superorganism is the one that defines its 
constitution. This is a much slower process which can be seen, for example, when a 
queen ant founds her colony. The queen governs the process of caste morphogenesis [9]. 
Within the new colony, the queen, having just mated with her suitors and received more 
than 200 million sperm, shakes off her wings and digs a little nest in the ground, where 
she now is in a race with time to produce her worker offspring. She raises her first brood 
of workers by converting her body fat and muscles into energy. She must create a 
perfectly balanced work force that is the smallest possible in size, yet capable of 
successful foraging, so that the workers can bring food to her before she starves to death. 
 
The queen produces the workers of the correct size for her initial survival and later, after 
the colony has started going, she produces a complement of workers of different sizes as 
well as soldier ants in order to have the right organization for the survival of the colony. 
When researchers have removed members of a specific caste from an ongoing colony, the 
queen compensates for this deficit by producing more members of that caste. The 
communication process behind this remarkable control is not known. The communication 
mechanisms of the ant or the honeybee superorganisms may be supposed to have analogs 
in the brain. 
 
Anomalous abilities and deficits amongst humans 
 
That cognitive ability cannot be viewed simply as a processing of sensory information 
by a central intelligence extraction system is confirmed by individuals with anomalous 
abilities. Idiot savants, or simply savants, who have serious developmental disability or 
major mental illness, perform spectacularly at certain tasks. Anomalous performance has 
been noted in the areas of mathematical and calendar calculations; music; art, including 
painting, drawing or sculpting; mechanical ability; prodigious memory (mnemonism); 
unusual sensory discrimination or “extrasensory” perception. The abilities of these 
savants and of mnemonists cannot be understood in the framework of a monolithic mind. 
 
Oliver Sacks, in his book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat  [10] describes two 
twenty-six year old twins, John and Michael, with IQs of sixty who are remarkable at 
calendrical calculations even though “they cannot do simple addition or subtraction with 
any accuracy, and cannot even comprehend what multiplication means.” More impressive 
is their ability to factor numbers into primes since “primeness” is an abstract concept. 
Looking from an evolutionary perspective, it is hard to see that performing abstract 
numerical calculations related to primes would provide an advantage? 
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The architecture of the brain provides clues to the relationships amongst the agents, and 
this architecture is illuminated by examining deficits in function caused by injury.  
One might expect aphasia to be accompanied by a general reduction in the capacity to 
talk, understand, read, write, as well as do mathematics and remember things. One might 
also suppose that the ability to read complex technical texts would be affected much more 
than the capacity to understand simple language and to follow commands. 
 
In reality, the relationship between these capacities is very complex. In aphasia, many of 
these capacities, by themselves or in groups, can be destroyed or spared in isolation from 
the others. Historically, several capacities related to language have been examined. 
These include fluency in conversation, repetition, comprehension of spoken language, 
word-finding disability, and reading disturbances. 
 
In alexia, the subject is able to write while unable to read; in alexia combined with 
agraphia, the subject is unable to write or read while retaining other language faculties; 
in acalculia, the subject has selective difficulty in dealing with numbers. 
 
The complex manner in which these aphasias manifest establishes that language 
production is a very intricate process More specifically, it means that at least certain 
components of the language functioning process operate in a  yes/no fashion. 
These components include comprehension, production, repetition, and various abstract 
processes. But to view each as a separate module only tells half the story. There exist 
very subtle interrelationships between these capabilities which all come into operation in 
normal behavior. 
 
Blindsight and agnosia 
 
There are anecdotal accounts of blind people who can see sometime and deaf people who 
can likewise hear.  Some brain damaged subjects cannot consciously see an object in 
front of them in certain places within their field of vision, yet when asked to guess if a 
light had flashed in their region of blindness, the subjects guess right at a probability 
much above that of chance. 
 
Blindsight has been explained as being a process similar to that of implicit memory or 
it has been proposed that consciousness is a result of a dialog going on between different 
regions of the brain. When this dialog is disrupted, even if the sensory signals do reach 
the brain, the person will not be aware of the stimulus.  
 
One may consider that the injury in the brain leading to blindsight causes the vision in the 
stricken field to become automatic. Then through retraining it might be possible to regain 
the conscious experience of the images in this field. In the holistic explanation, the 
conscious awareness is a correlate of the activity in a complex set of regions in the brain. 
No region can be considered to be producing the function by itself although damage to a 
specific region will lead to the loss of a corresponding function. 
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Agnosia is a failure of recognition that is not due to impairment of the sensory input or a 
general intellectual impairment. A visual agnosic patient will be unable to tell what he 
is looking at, although it can be demonstrated that the patient can see the object. 
Prosopagnosic patients are neither blind nor intellectually impaired; they can interpret 
facial expressions and they can recognize their friends and relations by name or voice. 
Yet they do not recognize specific faces, not even their own in a mirror! 
 
Prosopagnosia may be regarded as the opposite of blindsight. In blindsight there is 
recognition without awareness, whereas in prosopagnosia there is awareness without 
recognition. But there is evidence that the two syndromes have underlying similarity. 
Electrodermal recordings show that the prosopagnosic responds to familiar faces 
although without awareness of this fact. It appears, therefore, that the patient is 
subconsciously registering the significance of the faces. Prosopagnosia may be 
suppressed under conditions of associative priming. Thus if the patient is shown the 
picture of some other face it may trigger a recognition. 
 
Split Brains and unification 
 
The two hemispheres of the brain are linked by the rich connections of the corpus 
callosum. The visual system is arranged so that each eye normally projects to both 
hemispheres. By cutting the optic-nerve crossing, the chiasm, the remaining fibers in the 
optic nerve transmit information to the hemisphere on the same side. Visual input to the 
left eye is sent only to the left hemisphere, and input to the right eye projects only to the 
right hemisphere. The visual areas also communicate through the corpus callosum. 
When these fibers are also severed, the patient is left with a split brain. 
 
A classic experiment on cat with split brains was conducted by Ronald Myers and Roger 
Sperry [11]. They showed that cats with split brains did as well as normal cats when it 
came to learning the task of discriminating between a circle and a square in order to 
obtain a food reward, while wearing a patch on one eye. This showed that one half of the 
brain did as well at the task as both the halves in communication. When the patch was 
transferred to the other eye, the split-brain cats behaved different from the normal cats, 
indicating that their previous learning had not been completely transferred to the other 
half of the brain. 
 
Experiments on split-brain human patients raised questions related to the nature and the 
seat of consciousness. For example, a patient with left-hemisphere speech does not know 
what his right hemisphere has seen through the right eye. The information in the right 
brain is unavailable to the left brain and vice versa. The left brain responds to the 
stimulus reaching it whereas the right brain responds to its own input. Each half brain 
learns, remembers, and carries out planned activities. It is as if each half brain works and 
functions outside the conscious realm of the other. Such behavior led Sperry to suggest 
that there are “two free wills in one cranial vault.” 
 
But there are other ways of looking at the situation. One may assume that the split-brain 
patient has lost conscious access to those cognitive functions which are regulated by the 
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non-speech hemisphere. Or, one may say that nothing is changed as far as the awareness 
of the patient is considered and the cognitions of the right brain were linguistically 
isolated all along, even before the commissurotomy was performed. The procedure only 
disrupts the visual and other cognitive-processing pathways. 
 
The patients themselves seem to support this second view. There seems to be no 
antagonism in the responses of the two hemispheres and the left hemisphere is able 
to fit the actions related to the information reaching the right hemisphere in a plausible 
theory. For example, consider the test where the word “pink” is flashed to the right 
hemisphere and the word “bottle” is flashed to the left. Several bottles of different colors 
and shapes are placed before the patient and he is asked to choose one. He immediately 
picks the pink bottle explaining that pink is a nice colour. Although the patient is not 
consciously aware of the right eye having seen the word “pink” he, nevertheless, “feels” 
that pink is the right choice for the occasion. In this sense, this behavior is very similar to 
that of blindsight patients.  
 
The brain has many modular circuits that mediate different functions. Not all of these 
functions are part of conscious experience. When these modules related to conscious 
sensations get “crosswired,” this leads to synesthesia. One would expect that similar 
joining of other cognitions is also possible. A deliberate method of achieving such a 
transition from many to one is a part of some meditative traditions.  
 
It is significant that patients with disrupted brains never claim to have anything other than 
a unique awareness. The reductionists opine that consciousness is nothing but the activity 
in the brain but this is mere semantic play which sheds no light on the problem. If shared 
activity was all there was to consciousness, then this would have been destroyed or 
multiplied by commissurotomy. Split brains should then represent two minds just as 
in freak births with one trunk and two heads we do have two minds. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has considered evidence from physical and biological sciences to show how 
machines are deficient compared to biological systems at incorporating intelligence. To 
recapitulate the main points, machines fall short on two counts as compared to brains. 
Firstly, unlike brains, machines do not self-organize in a recursive manner. Secondly, 
machines are based on classical logic, whereas Nature’s intelligence may depend on 
quantum mechanics.  
 
Quantum mechanics provides us a means of obtaining information about a system 
associated with various attributes. A quantum state is a linear superposition of its 
component states. Since the amplitudes are complex numbers, a quantum system cannot 
be effectively simulated by the Monte Carlo method using random numbers. One cannot 
run a physical process if its probability amplitude is negative or complex!  
 
The evidence from neuroscience that we reviewed showed how specific centers in the 
brain are dedicated to different cognitive tasks. But these centers do not merely do signal 
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processing: each operates within the universe of its experience so that it is able to 
generalize individually. This generalization keeps up with new experience and is further 
related to other cognitive processes in the brain. It is in this manner that cognitive ability 
is holistic and irreducible to a mechanistic computing algorithm. Viewed differently, each 
agent is an apparatus that taps into the “universal field of consciousness.” On the other 
hand, AI machines based on classical computing principles have a fixed universe of 
discourse so they are unable to adapt in a flexible manner to a changing universe. This is 
why they cannot match biological intelligence. 
 
Quantum theory has the potential to provide understanding of certain biological processes 
not amenable to classical explanation. Take the protein-folding problem. Proteins are 
sequences of large number of amino acids. Once a sequence is established, the protein 
folds up rapidly into a highly specific three-dimensional structure that determines its 
function in the organism. It has been estimated that a fast computer applying plausible 
rules for protein folding would need 10127 years to find the final folded form for even a 
very short sequence of 100 amino acids [12]. Yet Nature solves this problem in a few 
seconds. Since quantum computing can be exponentially faster than conventional 
computing, it could very well be the explanation for Nature's speed [13]. The anomalous 
efficiency of other biological optimization processes may provide indirect evidence of 
underlying quantum processing if no classical explanation is forthcoming.  
 
At an abstract level, if evolution of life has led to the emergence of mind, machines with 
minds must also emerge. Tipler and Barrow argue that man will create silicon machines 
with minds that will slowly spread all over the world, and the entire universe will 
eventually become a conscious machine [14]. 
 
In my view, if machines with consciousness are created, they would be living machines, 
that is, variations on life forms as we know them. Since the material world is not causally 
closed, and consciousness influences its evolution, matter and minds complement each 
other. At the level of the individual, even medical science that is strongly based on the 
machine paradigm is acknowledging the influence of mind on body [15].  
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